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Abstract
This paper revisits optimal tax enforcement policy, focusing on
two elements of that policy: (1) the optimal mix of government-level
tax administration and individual-level tax compliance; and (2) the
optimal mix of this combination (together, tax enforcement) and tax
rates. The standard view is that we should weight tax administration
but not tax compliance by the government’s cost of funds because we
must pay for tax administration, but not compliance, through distorting taxes. As a result, we might want to rely on tax compliance
measures even when using tax administration would otherwise be less
expensive. Using a flexible model that allows the costs of tax administration and compliance to be imposed in arbitrary ways, I find
instead that we should choose between administration and compliance
costs purely on effectiveness grounds, without weighting. The reason
is that tax administration and tax compliance impose equivalent types
of costs and distortions. Both required forced exactions. Using this
result, I derive a formula for the optimal mix of tax rates and the
overall level of enforcement. Finally, I briefly comment on how the
analysis may change in a redistributive income tax context.
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Introduction

The United States currently spends roughly an order of magnitude more on
taxpayer-level compliance measures than on government-level tax administration. Estimates of tax compliance costs in the United States are about
$150 billion per year, or just under 1% of GDP. Marcuss et al. (2013). The
budget of the Internal Revenue Service is about $11 billion per year.
This ten-to-one ratio is not inevitable. We could easily shift some of the
costs of tax enforcement to the government. For example, some countries
have the government fill out initial tax returns, requiring taxpayers only
to confirm their accuracy. Gale and Holtzblatt (1997). California experimented with a similar system known as Ready Return. Bankman (2008).
The government could also spend more on taxpayer assistance, perform more
information collection on its own, or reduce compliance costs in other ways.
Analyses of the trade-off between tax administration and compliance focus on the difference in how they impose costs. Tax administration is funded
through tax revenues and, therefore, imposes costs through the higher taxes
needed to fund government agencies. Tax compliance costs are imposed
directly on taxpayers and do not require higher taxes. As a result of this difference, analysts have concluded that we should weight tax administration
but not tax compliance by the government’s cost of funds (or alternatively,
by the marginal benefit of public goods). Keen and Slemrod (2017), Slemrod
and Yitzhaki (2002), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1996). This approach has begun
to influence empirical studies of tax enforcement (e.g., Basri et al (2019)).
I re-examine the trade-off between tax administration and tax compliance.
The core intuition is that there should be no a priori weighting against
tax administration because of the taxes needed to pay for it. Both tax
administration and tax compliance impose mandatory costs. The costs of
tax administration are imposed through taxes. Tax compliance is funded
through mandated expenditures. Both reduce resources available for private
consumption through forced exactions. The question is not whether one is
tax-like and the other not. Instead, it is how those costs distort behavior
and which raises more revenue for a given distortion.
To illustrate, suppose that we increase compliance costs by requiring taxpayers to use a special, expensive kind of payment system (e.g., we ban cash
and require electronic payments or require a special form of cash register).
The goal of doing this is to increase the marginal cost of evasion, thereby
reducing evasion. Taxpayers bear a cost. If they were previously using cash
1
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rather than the mandated electronic payment system, moving to the electronic payment system makes them worse off. The marginal cost of evasion,
however, hopefully goes up, and taxpayers evade less, generating a benefit
from the new compliance obligation.
Compare that to the government raising taxes on the same sources of
funds that taxpayers would have used to pay for the electronic payment system. The government uses the revenue to provide the identical payment
system free of charge (and if needed, requiring its use). Once again, taxpayers pay a cost, this time in additional taxes. The marginal cost of evasion
goes up, by construction, identically because the newly required electronic
payment system is the same system in both cases. This means that taxpayers
evade less, again by the same amount. The choice between using compliance
or administration depends only on which is a less expensive method of providing the payment system. For example, there might be economies of scale
in government provision of the payment system, or diseconomies due to inefficiencies in the government bidding process compared to private purchases.
Weighting government by the cost of funds would distort the decision, possibly producing the wrong results.
To model the problem, I build off of the model in Keen and Slemrod
(2017). I extend it by allowing a more flexible representation of tax compliance and tax administrative costs as well as considering a more general
tax system that includes different tax bases and rates for different activities.
The intuition described above holds in the model: given tax administration
and tax compliance policies with the same nominal cost imposed on the same
margin, we should pick the one that is most effective, defined as generating
a larger increase in reported income.
The model brings out two additional features of the choice between tax
administration and compliance. The first is what I call targeting. Welltargeted enforcement, in the sense used here, imposes costs only on evasion
activities and not on other primary activities. For example, a compliance
system that requires everyone to keep additional records or fill out forms
just to catch a small number of tax evaders is not well-targeted because the
costs are imposed broadly. Badly-targeted tax enforcement systems impose
costs on primary activities, such as working or saving, much in the same
way taxes do. A tax enforcement system that impacts only those who evade
or are likely to evade is well targeted. It does not impose costs on primary
activities.
Tax compliance measures and tax administration measures may differ in
2
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how well they are targeted. Bad targeting imposes tax-like costs in that it
raises the cost of engaging in activities such as working or saving, just like
taxes do. Therefore, if one but not the other is badly targeted, we should
weight the use of that instrument by the costs of the poor targeting. For example, if compliance obligations were perfectly targeted, imposing costs only
on evasion, while the taxes used to pay for tax administration fall on general
activities, we restore the intuition from prior literature that we should weight
tax administration but not compliance by the cost of funds. This corner solution, however, need not, and generally will not, arise in practice. Instead,
as anyone who has spent time filling out a tax return knows, compliance
obligations impose costs on many activities other than evasion.
A second difference between tax administration and tax compliance is
that the taxes used to pay for tax administration can be imposed on any
margin while the costs of tax compliance measures tend to fall on the margin
where compliance is sought. For example, if we want to reduce evasion
through the use of Swiss bank accounts, we can increase audits of these
accounts, paying for the audits through general taxes, through additional
taxes on offshore bank accounts, or taxes on some other activity. If we
attempt to reduce evasion through the use of Swiss bank accounts through
compliance measures, such as by mandating additional reporting, the costs
tend to fall on the use of Swiss bank accounts rather than on other activities.
I will suggest analyzing this difference in how costs may be imposed by
breaking the analysis into two steps. In the first, we can imagine that both
tax administrative measures and tax compliance measures impose costs along
the same margin (i.e., the margin where enforcement policy is being changed).
The analysis of this first step is as above: we should look at targeting and
effectiveness. The second step is just a tax swap: change the taxes imposed
on the first step for the actual taxes imposed. The analysis of this second
step can be done using standard public finance tools for analyzing the effects
of taxes on different activities.
Finally, the results regarding the trade-off between tax administration
and compliance inform the appropriate trade-off between enforcement actions and the use tax rates to raise revenue. Both additional enforcement
and raising taxes can produce government revenue. They do so in different
ways, however. As is well–recognized, changes to tax rates affect tax revenues through behavioral effects and mechanical effects. Due to envelope
properties, small changes in behavior do not effect utility, so we can think of
the behavioral effects generating as a fiscal externality (using language from
3
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Hendren (2016)). Mechanical effects reduce utility and generate revenues.
They are transfers. The net effect of mechanical changes to tax payments is
the difference between the private value of funds and their social value.
Changes to tax enforcement policies also generate behavioral effects and
fiscal externalities. They may also create mechanical effects. For example,
taxpayers may incur additional costly recordkeeping obligations on all of
their income. Mechanical effects in the case of enforcement obligations, however, are not transfers. They are pure losses. The mix between enforcement
and tax rates accounts for these similarities and differences between the two
instruments.
I proceed as follows. Part 2 presents the basic the model without evasion
and tax enforcement, but with multiple income-producing factors, each of
which can be taxed at different rates. It develops what can be thought
of as an extended version of the elasticity of taxable income formula that
accounts for multiple tax bases. It also includes an explicit representation
of the mechanical effects of taxes (most often left out of ETI formulas).
Mechanical effects are transfers to or from the government, and should be
valued accordingly.
Part 3 adds evasion, compliance, and administration. A core difficulty in
understanding and modeling the difference between tax administration and
tax compliance is how each affects behavior. While tax administration is a
government-level activity, to change behavior it has to enter the individual
utility function, such as by changing the marginal cost of evasion. Tax compliance measures also seek to change the marginal cost of evasion. Part 3
starts by considering an example to develop intuitions for how these costs
enter utility, and then uses those intuitions to complete the model.
It then examines and compares the welfare effects of marginal changes
to tax compliance requirements and tax administration, generating the core
result of the paper, which is that they should be compared to one another
purely based on their effectiveness in generating revenue. The analysis also
shows how targeting is central to the choice between the two instruments,
and how, if they impose costs on different factors, they can be compared
using the two-step breakdown suggested above.
Part 4 uses this framework to consider the optimal mix of taxes and enforcement. Finally, Part 5 considers aspects of the problem left out of the
analysis. Most centrally, the analysis follows Keen and Slemrod in using
a representative individual framework. Distributional considerations may
change some of the conclusions. In particular, following the arguments in
4
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Kaplow (2004, 2006a, 2006b, and 2012), as well as those in Jacobs (2018),
the marginal cost of public funds may be taken to be 1 once distributional
considerations are taken into account. If the marginal cost of public funds
is 1, the differences between the standard weighting approach and the conclusions here is smaller. In addition, as discussed in Kopzcuk (2001), once
we add distributional considerations, we need to consider the role of tax enforcement in assisting with the redistributive goals of the tax rate structure.
Part 5 briefly discusses these issues. Part 6 concludes.

1.1

Prior literature

There is a substantial prior literature on tax enforcement. Surveys include
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), Alm (2012), and Slemrod (2019). Much of the
prior work focuses on particular enforcement strategies, such as the trade-off
between audits and penalties. Some of this work explicitly models compliance
costs, usually referring to these costs as ”concealment technologies” or costly
sheltering efforts (e.g., Usher (1986), Kaplow (1990), Cowell (1990), and
Mayshar (1991)). These models do not, however, separately account for the
costs of government-level actions to reduce evasion and, therefore, do not
inform the trade-off examined here.
More recent work has focused on understanding taxpayer responses to
various enforcement strategies, often through randomized controlled trials
conducted with government cooperation. This work often focuses on tax
administrative measures such as threats of audit, but it does not seek to
understand the differences between similar taxpayer-level and governmentlevel strategies. In addition, in response to perceived (or real) increases in
evasion, governments have experimented with numerous strategies, such as
information sharing or additional reporting requirements, and we have been
able to learn about the effectiveness of different approaches to enforcement by
observing the results. Use of large scale administrative data has also allowed
estimates of evasion elasticities (e.g., Best at al 2015.)
The primary work with implications for the trade-off between private
concealment costs and government-level tax administration costs are Keen
and Slemrod (2017) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1996). Keen and Slemrod
(2017) assumes that mandatory compliance costs fall on evasion and not on
what I will call primary activities, such as working or saving. That is, they
make a particular assumption about targeting. An immediate implication of
this assumption is that we should prefer mandating compliance costs over
5
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raising taxes to pay for tax administration: it is better to raise the cost of
evasion than to raise the cost of working or saving.
A similar result emerges in Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1996) (expression 8),
where the costs of tax administration and the costs of tax compliance are
assumed to enter utility differently. Basri et al (2019) use a model similar to
Keen and Slemrod to study tax enforcement choices in Indonesia. Gemmell
and Hasseldine (2014) is an exception to the assumptions about how the
costs of tax compliance enter utility: they emphasize that enforcement may
change effective tax rates. They do not, however, examine the questions
explored here.

2

No evasion or enforcement

I start by presenting the model without evasion and enforcement and then,
in the next section add these activities. Without evasion, the model is a
generalized version of the elasticity of taxable income, similar to, though
simpler than, the version found in Hendren (2016). The generalization of the
usual ETI approach will be helpful for examining the differences between tax
administration and compliance in the next section.
A representative individual supplies N factors, xi , i ∈ [0, N ] . The return
per unit of factor i is wi . Factors include labor in the formal sector, labor in
the informal sector, provision of capital of various types, home production,
or any other input. The government imposes tax rate ti on factor i. The
value of ti can be negative, in which case the government is subsidizing the
activity. If ti = 0, the activity is not in the tax base.
Supplying factor i imposes an additively-separable cost of ψi (xi ) , with
0
ψ > 0, ψ 00 > 0. The cost term is intended to be inclusive, encompassing lost
leisure, time, deferred consumption, or any other cost.
The individual’s problem is:
max
[xi ]

n
X

(1 − ti ) wi xi − ψi (xi ) .

i=1

The first order conditions for this problem are:
(1 − ti ) wi = −

dψi
.
dxi

6
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The Lagrangian (with R as the budget constraint) is:1
L=

N
X

(1 − ti ) wi xi − ψi (xi ) + λ

i=1

N
X

!
ti wi xi − R .

i=1

The first order condition with respect to ti (noting that because we differentiate with respect to i, we sum over j):
!
N
N
X
X
dxj
dψj dxj
dxj
∂L
= −wi xi + v 0 wi xi +
(1 − tj ) wj
−
+λ
tj wj
.
∂ti
dtj
dxj dti
dtj
j=1
j=1
Using the individual first order conditions and simplifying gives:
N
X
∂L
dxj
=λ
tj wj
+ (λ − 1) wi xi .
∂ti
dt
j
j=1

(1)

We can interpret (1) as the marginal change in welfare for a change in
the tax rate. It is the multiple rate, multiple base analogue to the elasticity
of taxable income approach of Feldstein (1995, 1999). With a single tax rate
applicable to all taxed income, it becomes:
t
dL
=λ
T IεT I + (λ − 1) T I,
dt
1−t
where T I is taxable income and εT I is the elasticity of taxable income with
respect to the net of tax rate. It is also a simplified version of Hendren
(2016)’s policy elasticity. Hendren has a general utility function, an explicit
representation of the production of public goods (compressed here into a
budget constraint), and allows taxation of goods as well as factors. These
features are not central to the analysis here, so they are omitted.
To understand expression (1), it is useful to focus on the difference between mechanical effects and behavioral effects of a change in tax rates. If we
change rate ti , both arise. The behavioral effect is the first term on the right
1
Keen and Slemrod use the equivalent approach of maxinizing individual welfare where
the value of government spending (other than on tax administration) is v (.) . I will instead use the Lagrange multiplier formulation. The two techniques yield the same results,
interpreting the multiplier as v 0 , and the derivative of the Lagrangian as marginal welfare
with respect to a given variable.
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hand side of (1). It reflects the change in the choice of each xj when we change
ti . If this term is positive, the tax rate change generates a pure welfare gain.
For example, if rates go down and individuals work more, the social benefit
of the additional work can be measured by the change in tax revenue: the
individual is no better or worse off because of the envelope theorem but, by
working more, generates a fiscal externality reflected in government revenue.
The second term, (λ − 1) wi xi , is a mechanical effect of a tax rate change.
Holding the choice of xi constant, there is a change in revenue due to the
change in the tax rate.
The mechanical effect is weighted in the marginal welfare calculation by
(λ − 1) while the behavioral effect is weighted by λ. The differences arises
because the envelope theorem does not apply to the mechanical effect. The
individual is worse off. Therefore, we need to weight it by (λ − 1) , the value
to the government of the funds, λ, minus the value to the individual, 1.
Expression (1) is the multiple-base, multiple-rate analogue to the elasticity of taxable income. With only one factor of production and λ = 1, we
get the usual elasticity of taxable income formulation. With more than one
taxed factor, but λ = 1, we get the rule that marginal revenue effects are a
sufficient statistic for welfare. In the more general case, we must account for
mechanical transfers (the (λ − 1) wi xi term), as well as changes to revenue
due to behavioral changes (the first term on the right hand side).
Note that expression (1) solves the base-shifting problem of the ETI in a
cleaner way than the suggestions in Chetty (2009) and Saez, Slemrod, and
Giertz (2012). These authors suggest having separate ETIs for each tax base
and adjusting them by shifting factors to reflect the movement of earnings
across bases in response to taxation. Expression (1) shows how a single
statistic can be used to capture all of these effects.

3
3.1

Evasion and Enforcement
Motivating example

We want to add tax enforcement to this model. Including evasion is standard in ETI models. The more difficult problem is how tax compliance and
administration enter. Tax administration is thought of as a government-level
expenditure but to change evasion levels, it has to enter the individual utility
function. Care about how this occurs is central to the underlying model. To
8
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develop intuitions for these terms, I start with a motivating example before
turning to the formal presentation.
Consider an individual engaging in a taxed activity (the primary activity),
such as working or investing. The model will allow for an arbitrary number
of primary activities, but for purposes of developing intuitions, consider a
single activity that is prone to evasion, such as investing in a Swiss bank
account or working in a cash business.
The individual chooses the extent of that activity, such as how much
to invest in the Swiss bank account or how many hours to devote to the
cash business. The activity generates earnings such as investment returns
or wages. Engaging in the activity imposes a cost, such as lost leisure time,
deferred consumption, or fees paid to Swiss bankers for their discretion. The
individual reports some portion of the earnings, and pays taxes on the reported amount. The unreported amount, evasion, is tax free.
The government has two tools to reduce evasion. It can impose compliance obligations or costs on the individual and it can use administrative
tools. Compliance obligations are requirements that the individual do certain things that make evasion more difficult. They include reporting, keeping
records, using special traceable forms of payment, and hiring private monitors such as accountants and lawyers. Compliance costs also include costs
incurred to conceal income, such as engaging in elaborate tax shelters, what
prior literature has modeled as the costs of concealment technology, or what
we might call non-compliance costs.
Compliance obligations are costly. As noted, in the United States, they
are on the order of 1% of GDP. If they were perfectly targeted at evasion,
the individual would bear the costs only to the extent of evasion. They
may, however, fall on the primary activity. For example, we might require
special and expensive reporting for all holders of Swiss bank accounts even
though only a fraction of them evade taxes. Or we might impose onerous
rules on all cash businesses to prevent evasion by a few. The reason for this
poor targeting is that we do not know in advance which activities generate
evasion, which individuals engaging in those activities will evade, and how
much they will evade. We cannot simply say, report your evasion. Instead,
the nets used to catch evasion have to be cast broadly, which means that to
some extent, compliance costs fall on primary activities as well as evasion. I
will refer to the extent that compliance costs fall only on evasion as the level
of targeting.
The government’s other tool is tax administration, which includes things
9
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such as returns processing, audits, levies, and collection.2 These tax administration activities are also designed to reduce evasion. To reduce evasion,
they have to affect the individual’s return from evasion. In the terminology
used here, administrative actions change marginal compliance costs just like
the rules directly governing compliance obligations do.
To illustrate, suppose that the government has an administrative tool,
such as an evasion detection technology. To reduce evasion, the technology
has to impose costs on evasion. For example, if the detection technology is
additional audits, taxpayers will incur compliance costs responding to those
audits or incur additional costs to conceal income from the auditors. To
reduce evasion, the audits should increase the marginal cost of evasion, such
as by increasing the ability of the government to detect and sanction evasion.
One may object that the additional costs taxpayers incur beause of changes
to tax administraiton are private costs and, therefore, best classified as tax
compliance. But note that the only way tax administration has any effect on
evasion is by changing private costs, so classifying all such costs as compliance
costs would leave no role for tax administration.
The distinction between compliance and administration, therefore, is not
purely whether private or public entities incur the cost. It is whether the
cost arises because of a change in government-level activity, such as more
audits, or because of taxpayer obligations, such as a requirement to keep
more records. To illustrate, suppose that a taxpayer spends money on an
elaborate evasion technique designed to avoid detection. That expenditure
may be classified as a tax compliance cost—the technique may, for example, avoid reporting requirements. It may also be classified as due to tax
administration—it may avoid government-level information collection efforts.
The costs are most likely jointly caused. We care about setting optimal levels of administration and compliance, which means we care about how a
marginal change in policy affects these costs. As a result, it is not necessary
to choose which is the single or most important reason why the taxpayer
incurred the cost. Instead, we care about how changing government-level
activity such as information processing affects taxpayer activities.
As with compliance costs more generally, the additional compliance costs
2

In 2018, the IRS spent about $4.7 bilion (of of $11.7 billion) on activities it labels
enforcement, inlcuding investigations ($600 million), examinations and collections ($3.8
billion) and regualtory ($170 million). It spent $2.5 on what it labels taxpayer services,
such as pre-filing assistance and filing and account services. The rest of its budget is
operations supporting such as information services. (IRS Budget Table 28, irs.gov)
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generated by tax administration may be well-targeted or not. For example, the evasion detection technology considered above might perfectly locate
and prevent evasion, imposing no costs on non-evaders. It might, however,
be badly targeted. For example, it might involve audits of all Swiss bank
accounts. In this case the costs of tax administration fall on the primary
activity more generally.
A key distinction between tax administration and compliance is that tax
administration (at least the government component of tax administration)
is funded through taxes. Taxes affect the the ability of the government to
provide public goods. The analysis below holds spending on public goods
constant to allow a clean comparison between tax compliance and administration.
Finally, note that as with direct compliance costs and the private costs of
tax administration, taxes used to pay for tax administration may be well, or
badly, targeted. Taxes to pay for administration are well-targeted if they fall
on evasion, increasing the cost of evasion without increasing the costs of primary activities such as working. For example, fines, penalties, or additional
taxes on evasion can be used to pay for tax administration, in which case the
tax is well-targeted. Even modest taxes on evasion would more than pay for
all tax administrative activities in the United States.3 Alternatively, general
taxes, such as taxes on labor income or on Swiss bank accounts (generally,
not limited to those used for evasion), might be used, in which case the tax is
badly targeted. The model below will only examine the use of general taxes
to fund tax administration but could be extended to allow targeted taxes.

3.2

Model setup

Using this motivation, allow the individual to choose to evade or not report
an amount ei along each margin i. Reported income along margin i is:
zi = wi xi − ei
After-tax income along margin i is (1 − ti ) zi + ei = (1 − ti ) wi xi + ti ei .
Government policy imposes compliance obligations, ci , on the individual.
They are costly and, therefore, reduce the amount otherwise available for
consumption.
3

The IRS assessed $29 billion in civil penalities in 2018, more than double its entire budget and six times the portion of its budget labeled enforcement. See Table 17,
irs.gov/statistics.
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To be effective, they need to be a function of evasion, ci = ci (e) , with
> 0, c00i > 0. If compliance obligations were perfectly targeted at evasion,
the individual would bear the costs only to the extent of evasion. As noted,
they may, however, fall on primary activities. This means that ci = ci (ei , xi ) .
I do not impose a sign on ∂ci /∂xi . The central case I will examine is when
compliance obligations impose a tax-like cost, so ∂ci /∂xi > 0. Slemrod (2001)
focuses on the case where ∂ci /∂xi < 0, an effect which he calls the evasion
facilitating effect of income. Keen and Slemrod (2017) assume ∂c/∂x = 0,
which is part of the reason for their conclusions about the differences between
tax administration and compliance.
We will want to consider policies that change compliance obligations,
which, following Keen and Slemrod, I will denote as a continuous variable
α: ci = (ei , xi , α) . A change in α may change the overall level of compliance
costs: ∂ci /∂α need not be zero. The goal of compliance policy changes,
however, is to change evasion choices, which means the goal of changing α is
to change ∂ci /∂ei . That is, we care about ∂ 2 ci /∂ei ∂α. In addition, changes
to compliance policy may how compliance costs effect primary activities,
∂ 2 ci /∂xi ∂α. Better targeting means increasing ∂ci /∂ei and reducing ∂ci /∂xi .
I will leave α without a subscript because α could be a complex policy that
changes many things at once. For the most part, however, I will assume that
α changes policy along the margin being considered (generically, margin i in
the analysis below).
The second tool to reduce evasion is tax administration, A. Tax administration is paid for out of the government budget, which means that spending
on (other) public goods is net of the cost of tax administration.4
As discussed, to reduce evasion, tax administration has to affect the individual’s cost of evasion. Government-level activities must enter the individual’s utility function. In particular, to work, tax administration has to
change the effectiveness of compliance costs in making evasion more expensive: ci = ci (ei , xi , Ai , α) .
In particular, to reduce evasion, tax administration has to impose costs on
evasion. This means that the core effects of tax administration is ∂ 2 ci /∂ei ∂A,
parallel to the goals of tax compliance policy.

c0i

4

In 2018, the IRS spent about $4.7 bilion (of $11.7 billion) on activities it labels enforcement, including investigations ($600 million), examinations and collections ($3.8 billion),
and regulatory ($170 million). It spent $2.5 billion on what it labels taxpayer services,
such as pre-filing assistance and filing and account services. The rest of its budget is
operations supporting such as information services. (IRS Budget Table 28, irs.gov)
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As with compliance costs more generally, the additional compliance costs
generated by tax administration may be well-targeted or not, as reflected
by the value of ∂ 2 ci /∂xi ∂A. For example, the evasion detection technology
might perfectly locate and prevent evasion, imposing no costs on non-evaders:
∂ 2 ci /∂xi ∂A = 0. It might, however, be badly targeted. For example, it
might involve audits of all Swiss bank accounts rather than just those used
for evasion. In this case the costs of tax administration fall on the primary
activity more generally. Therefore, we can think of the value of ∂ 2 ci /∂xi ∂A
as a measure of how well targeted administrative expenditures are.
Because both compliance policy and tax administration policy affect what
I have labeled compliance costs, it is useful to clarify the terminology. Compliance obligations or costs, c, are all the things taxpayers have to do, or
are caused to do, to comply with the tax system. There are two related
but distinct policy levers that change compliance obligations or costs. The
first is α, which changes what we might think of as direct obligations, such
as records, forms, and payments to service providers such as accountants
to keep the record or file the forms. The second is tax administration, A.
Changes to tax administration indirectly change c. For example, if the government cross-checks records (when it previously didn’t), evasion may be
more difficult, increasing ∂c/∂e. Or the government might increase audits
and depending on how well the audits are targeted, this may increase, ∂c/∂x
and ∂c/∂e.
In most cases, whether a policy changes α or A will be relatively clear but
in some cases the distinction between the two will be unclear. For example,
an increase in audits is clearly a change in tax administration. I will interpret
the the costs of responding to the new audits as a cost of tax administration.
They are costs induced by a change in administration, so they are ∂c/∂A. In
other cases, the distinction between tax administration and compliance will
break down. Ultimately, what matters are the effects of a policy, not whether
it is classified as tax administration or compliance. Notwithstanding these
boundary cases, the distinction is often clear and worth understanding.
With these additions, utility is now:
U=

N
X

[(1 − ti ) wi xi − ψi (xi ) + ti ei − ci (ei , xi , Ai , α)] .

i=1

13
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Individual maximization gives:
xi : (1 − ti ) wi = −

dψi
∂ci
−
,
dxi
∂xi

∂ci
.
∂ei
Note that the choice of xi and ei are simultaneous because both xi and ei
affect ci .
The budget now must account for administrative costs. Setting units
so
P that we are spending A on tax administration, government spending is
i ti zi + A.
The Lagrangian is:
ei : ti =

L=

λ

N
X

[(1 − ti ) wi xi + ti ei − ψi (xi ) − ci (ei , xi , Ai , α)] +

i=1
N
X

(2)

!
ti zi + A − R

i=1

For the choice of ti , differentiate with respect to a change in tax rate i
(summing over j):
X
X dzj
∂L
dzj
dψj
∂cj
∂cj
= −zi −
(1 − tj )
−
−
−
+ λzi + λ
tj
∂ti
dti
dxj
∂xj
∂ej
∂ti
Substituting the individual first order conditions yields:
X dzj
∂L
= (λ − 1) zi + λ
tj
.
(3)
∂ti
dti
This is the same generalized version of the ETI give above except substituting reported income Σzi for true income Σwi xi . (”Taxed” income is a
better description than the standard term, ”taxable.” All income is taxable.
Only reported reported income is taxed.) It is the mechanical change in tax
revenue, multiplied by (λ − 1) and the social value of the behavioral change.
, to changes
The core problem is comparing changes to tax compliance, ∂L
∂α
∂L
in tax administration ∂A
. For a change in compliance policy, we have:
X
X dzj
∂L
∂ci
=−
((1 − ti ) wi xi + ti ei )
+λ
tj
∂α
∂α
dα
= −y

X dzj
∂ci
+λ
tj
,
∂α
dα
14
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(4)

P
where y is after-tax income, y =
((1 − ti ) zi + ei ). The first term reflects
mechanical costs from changes to compliance policy. Unlike for mechanical
effects of tax changes, these costs do not show up in the government budget
as a transfer (seen in the (λ − 1) z term in expression (3)). They are pure
losses. Mechanical compliance costs may apply to evasion as well as reported
income, and to keep the expression simple, I have applied them equally to
both. In many cases, they may apply differently to evasion and reported
income, and a straightforward generalization would allow that.
The second term, which uses short-hand notation (discussed below) reflects how changes to compliance policy change evasion and primary activities. These changes have no first order effect on utility but show up in the
government budget.
The first order condition with respect to administrative costs has the same
form, except differentiating with respect to A. Note, however, that a pure
change in administrative costs changes the budget constraint, generating:

X  dzj
∂ci
∂L
= −y
+λ
tj
−1 .
∂A
∂A
dA
To keep spending on public goods (other than tax administration) constant, we need to adjust tax rates to offset this change in the government budget. To allow the most informative comparisons to changes in compliance, it
is helpful to change tax rates so that they generate a change ingovernment

P
dz
revenue of 1 even though government revenues change by
tj dAj − 1 .
That is, we want to change tax rates to pay for the costs of changes to tax
administration but not to offset the effects of the change in tax administration. The reason is that the first order condition for changes in compliance
costs allowed government revenue to change because of changes in z. We
want the allow the same for changes to tax administration, which means we
want a tax increase to pay only for the mechanical costs of changing A.
dz
A small tax rate change of ti yields government revenue of zi +Σj tj dtij and
a utility loss to the individual of zi . A tax change
 that yields 1, therefore,
dzj
generates a utility loss of zA = zi / zi + Σj tj dti . Combing this tax change
with the change in tax administration yields:
X dzj
∂L
∂ci
= −y
− zA + λ
tj
.
∂A
∂A
dA

15

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3680827

(5)

3.3

Analysis

To compare changes to compliance policy to changes in tax administration,
set the marginal welfare effects equal to one another:

X  dzj
∂ci
∂ci
dzj
y
+ zA − y
=λ
tj
−
.
(6)
∂A
∂α
dA
dα
The left hand side is the difference in mechanical costs of a policy. The right
hand side is the difference in the effects on reported income.
Start by comparing policies that have the same nominal cost. This sets
the left hand side of (6) to zero. The nominal cost of the tax administration
policy is reflected in the change in taxes plus any individual-level costs that
arise due to the policy. The comparable costs of the tax compliance policy
are borne directly by the individual.
If these are the same, the choice between the two depends entirely on
their effectiveness at increasing taxable income. At the optimum, we want
X dzj X dzj
=
tj
.
tj
dA
dα

(7)

Note, centrally, for policies that have the same nominal cost, there should
be no weighting of one policy or the other for the cost of government funds.
As in the example in the introduction, both policies impose costs. Equally
expensive policies impose equal costs, so weighting one policy by those costs
and not the other would distort the choice between the two.
Policies with same nominal cost might have different real costs because
of targeting: they differentially fall on primary activities. Rewrite expression
(7) as
 X 

X  wj dxj
wj dxj
dej
dej
−
=
tj
−
.
tj
dA
dA
dα
dα
dx
dx
The terms dA
and dα
reflect how changes in enforcement policy affect primary activities. Recall that the individual’s choice of primary activities sets
∂ci
i
(1 − ti ) wi = − dψ
− ∂x
. The ordinary costs of engaging in the activity, ψ,
dxi
i
are not affected here. Changes in the level of the activity due to changes in
enforcement policy are determined by the values of d2 c/dxdA and d2 c/dxdα,
that is by how well targeted the policies are. If these are positive, (the policies are badly targeted) the level of primary activities go down, increasing
the social cost of the policy.
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We can think of poor targeting as imposing tax-like costs. As with
changes to tax rates, poorly-targeted enforcement increases the marginal
cost of engaging in an activity. While Keen and Slemrod do not have the
type of targeting examined here in their model, we can think of them as assuming that d2 ci /dxi dα = 0: compliance obligations or costs do not impose
any tax-like effects. We can hope that this is true, but in general it will not
be. We cannot, or perhaps only rarely, target evasion with precision.
For equally well-targeted compliance and administrative policies, we care
only about how they effect the marginal cost of evasion. This is determined
by the values of d2 ci /dei dA and d2 ci /dei dα. We prefer policies that increase
the marginal cost of evasion more. Again, there is no a priori preference
for compliance over administration. Instead, the values of these derivatives
depends on the particular technologies that are employed.
An assumption in the analysis above is that the tax change used to pay
for the change in tax administration was along the same margin as the change
in tax administration. That is, to pay for audits of Swiss banks, we increase
taxes on Swiss banks. This assumption need not be, and in general will not
be, true. We can pay for audits on Swiss banks by raising taxes on labor
income.
By contrast, the costs of tax compliance almost inevitably fall on the
margin where additional compliance is mandated. Compliance obligations to
reduce evasion by holders of Swiss banks likely fall on Swiss bank accounts.
Increasing reporting requirements for labor income would not change evasion
by holders of Swiss bank accounts.
The utility losses
from the tax used to pay for tax administration, zA =


dz
dzj
zi / zi + Σj tj dti , depend on which margin they fall on. Both zi and dtij
will be different for different choices of i. The size and effects of a tax on
labor income to pay for tax administration will be different than for a tax on
Swiss banks. As a result, expression (6), and by implication, expression (7),
depend on the choice of i (the latter because it implicitly sets the left hand
side of (6) to zero).
This difference between tax administration and compliance, however, is
more illusory than real. Consider an increases in taxes imposed on activity j
to pay for an increase to tax administration on activity i. We can restate this
policy as (1) taxes imposed on activity i to pay for the tax administration
and (2) a reduction in those taxes on activity i and an increase in taxes on
activity j. The first step is analyzed as above. The second step is analyzed
17
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like any other change in tax rates on different activities, using standard tools.
We can make similar adjustments on the compliance cost side. To the
extent compliance obligations along margin i increase the costs of engaging in
that activity, we can lower taxes to hold those constant. To keep the budget
fixed, we can then raise taxes on activity j. That is, we can go in either
direction to ensure comparability. We can always analyze enforcement policy
along a given margin by treating it as imposing all costs along that margin.
If some of the costs, such as the taxes used to pay for tax administration,
are actually imposed along a different margin, we can then analyze that
difference using the usual tools of public finance.

4

The choice between tax rates and tax enforcement

Another central question is the optimal trade-off between enforcement and
tax rates. That is, if we want to raise an additional dollar of revenue, is it
better to raise tax rates or increase enforcement? Keen and Slemrod (2017)
address this question, though under their restrictive assumptions about how
compliance cost affect utility.
To address this question, suppose that enforcement uses optimal mix of
tax administration and tax compliance tools. This means that the welfare effects of (1) a small increase in compliance obligations and (2) a small increase
in administration along with the taxes needed to pay for that increase, are
the same. Both increase revenue (net of the costs of tax administration) by
reducing evasion. Because compliance and administration impose the same
marginal cost, we can compare an increase in either one to an increase in
taxes.
Setting the marginal cost of a small increase in tax rates equal to the
marginal cost of an increase in compliance costs equal to one other, we get:


X  dzj
dzj
∂ci
= λ zi +
tj
−
.
(8)
zi − y
∂α
dti
dα
To understand this expression, compare a small increase in a tax rate,
ti , to a small increase in enforcement, in this case,
 α. The tax rate increase
dzi
generates a negative behavioral effect dti < 0 , and a transfer with social
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value (λ − 1) zi . An increase in compliance obligations and costs has an ambiguous effect on tax revenues. Depending on targeting, it may reduce xi
while also reducing evasion, ei . The net effect is ambiguous. Nevertheless,
short of being on the wrong side of the evasion Laffer curve, it increases tax
i
i
revenue, dz
> 0. This, however, is offset by a pure resource loss, y ∂c
. There
dα
∂α
is no offsetting transfer to the government.
The implications are not dissimilar to Keen and Slemrod’s expression
(15), in that both expression (8) and Keen and Slemrod’s equivalent expression focus on the relative revenue productivity of each instrument. A
key difference from Keen and Slemrod is the focus here on the difference
in mechanical costs of the two instruments. That is, both instruments can
produce revenue and, not surprisingly, we care about how effectively they do
so. Holding that fixed, the difference between taxes and enforcement is that
taxes also generate mechanical revenue (λzi ) while compliance costs do not.

5
5.1

Discussion
An aggregate measure

It might be useful for policy purposes to have an aggregate measure of how
an arbitrary policy intervention, whether to tax rates, tax base, or tax enforcement, affects welfare, a measure Hemel and Weisbach (2019) call the
Behavioral Elasticity of Tax Revenue. The measure effectively combines expressions (3), (4), and (5) to give the change in social welfare for a change
in an arbitrary tax policy.
Consider an arbitrary marginal change in tax policy. Regardless of whether
it is a tax rate change, tax base, or enforcement, the change in tax receipts
due to changes in behavior is a change in social welfare, weighted by the value
of government funds. These are fiscal externalities from behavioral changes.
The private effects of these changes in behavior do not affect social welfare
because of envelope properties. For example, an increase in reporting costs
by taxpayers due to a decision to conceal less income because of a change in
reporting rules does not affect social welfare.
Mechanical costs of changes to tax rates (including changing the base,
which can be thought of as a change in rates) and changes in enforcement
policy, however, enter social welfare differently. Mechanical changes in tax
payments due to changes in tax rates are a transfer from individuals to the
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government. Their social value is simply the difference, if any, between a
dollar in private hands and a dollar in public hands. Mechanical changes to
enforcement, reduce social welfare. They are a pure loss in resources. Mechanical changes to enforcement includes compliance costs that are incurred
even without behavioral changes, and changes to costs of tax administration.

5.2

Distribution

An important limitation of the analysis is its use of a representative individual
framework. This framework can provide insight into efficiency effects of taxes
but ignores distributive effects. There are two ways central ways a fuller
framework might affect the analysis.
First, one of the central differences between the conclusions here and
those in piror work is the marginal cost of funds, λ. Keen and Slemrod
would weight tax administration but not compliance by λ. The analysis here
suggests that this weighting is not warranted.
Adding distributive considerations has important implications for the
value of λ. In particular, at the optimum, the marginal social benefit of
redistribution equals the marginal deadweight loss from taxation, implying
λ = 1. In addition, away from the optimum, Kaplow (2004, 2006a, 2006b,
and 2014) has argued that under certain assumptions about the utility function, we should choose public goods as if λ = 1. The reason is that we can
adjust taxes so that the financing of the public good and the benefits of the
public good offset. Jacobs (2018) argues, if the government has a lump sum
tax available (in addition to an income tax), λ = 1 even in restricted setting
such as a linear income tax. Either way, with λ = 1, the approach suggested
by Keen and Slemrod and the approach suggested here are more similar.
Second, the representative individual framework eliminates the potential
distributive effects of enforcement. These were addressed in Kopczuk (2001).
A useful starting place to understand these issues is to make the simplifying
assumption that while individuals differ with respect to their earning ability, there is no additional heterogeneity in evasion (controlling for earning
capacity). Under this assumption, the mix of tax rates and tax enforcement
should be set efficiently. The reason is that we cannot gain any additional
redistributive leverage by using inefficient enforcement. The tax rate and
enforcement are redundant instruments.5 The results suggested above would
5

The conclusion also follows from Kaplow (2006). To illustrate, suppose the tax rate
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then apply.
Note that this does not imply that the level of enforcement is unrelated
to distributive concerns. As emphasized by Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002),
enforcement and higher tax rates tend to be complements. When we want to
redistribute more, we want both higher tax rates and more intense enforcement.
Evasion and underreporting, however, likely vary within ability levels.
For example, those who work in cash businesses may have less expensive
evasion opportunities than those who work for larger enterprises but earn
the same income. Individuals may also vary in their taste for evasion or
avoidance. Access to the black-market may be related to where one lives or
who one knows.
When we introduce heterogeneity in evasion, the analysis changes. As
emphasized by Kopczuk (2001), the effectiveness of redistribution through
tax rates depends on how reliable taxable income is as a measure of the need
for redistribution. Evasion and underreporting can make that signal stronger
or weaker depending on how they co-vary with ability to earn. If low taxable
income can indicate either low ability or a high level of evasion, tax rates
become less useful as a means of redistributing to those in need. On the
other hand, we may want more progressive rates if evasion opportunities are
concentrated among those with low ability.
We may be able to use the level of enforcement in this situation to improve redistribution. In particular, if avoidance or evasion serves as a useful
”tag” in the language of Ackerlof (1978) of those with a particular ability
level, then we can use enforcement to relax the incentive constraints on redistribution. For example, (as Kopczuk (2001) shows in a number of examples),
if avoidance is more accessible to those to whom we want to redistribute, we
may want to allow more avoidance than otherwise. The resulting redistributive gains may outweigh the revenue losses. The reverse is true if avoidance
is more accessible to those who we want to redistribute from. The optimal
mix of tax rates and enforcement may vary from expression (8).
too low and enforcement too high on an income class. Raise the rate, lower enforcement
in a way that holds their utility precisely fixed. For people in that income class, they
are no better or worse off but there is additional revenue because we have made the tax
system more efficient. Do this at each income level. Because utility levels stay the same
at each income level, there is no incentive to change work effort, which means that the
redistributive effects of the tax system remain the same. By construction, however, there
is additional tax revenue, which can be used to make everyone better off.
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Without a better understanding of the nature of evasion and underreporting, it not clear whether those who evade are more deserving or less. The first
thing that comes to mind when we think of evasion might be wealthy people
using off-shore bank accounts, but people may also evade if they experience
a significant bad shock and need resources. (A widely known type of evasion
is small businesses not remitting payroll taxes of their employees in order to
stave off bankruptcy.) The poor may have better access to black markets
than the rich and, therefore, view evasion as less costly than the rich. A
propensity to evade may also reflect a distaste for paying taxes, and it is not
clear how or whether we should take such a distaste into account in social
welfare. Evasion practices may vary widely and have many causes. The use
of evasion as a tag to identify individuals does not, without substantially
more study, tell us which way to make adjustments.

6

Conclusion

The central question addressed is how to choose enforcement policies focusing on (1) the mix of individual-level and government-level policies, and (2)
the mix of overall enforcement and tax rates. The core idea is that both tax
administration and tax compliance impose costs on taxpayers. Tax administration requires taxes to pay for government operations while tax compliance
requires taxpayer time and expenditures. If these costs fall on the same factors, they have the same effects and, as a result, we should choose the mix
of compliance and administration purely on effectiveness grounds.
The optimal mix of overall enforcement and tax rates in the representative
individual setting must take into account how these two instruments raise
rates. Both affect reported taxable income, though in different ways. In
general, increases in tax rates reduce reported income, while increases in
enforcement has ambiguous sign (though we may take it to increase reported
income in most cases). In addition, increases in tax rates generate transfers
for inframarginal behavior while increases in enforcement does not. Finally,
resources spent on enforcement are lost. The optimal mix of enforcement
and tax rates takes all of these factors into account.
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